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9.1  Introduction 
Until the postwar era, most-favored-nation  (MFN) treatment was far from 
universal.  The United  States, for example, negotiated  separate treaties gov- 
erning trade with a large number of countries and, until the 1920s, differenti- 
ated preferences were the norm.’ With the passage of the Reciprocal Trade 
Agreements Act in 1934, the United States shifted to an MFN policy for coun- 
tries with whom a treaty  was negotiated  and, in the postwar  years, strongly 
supported MFN through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
explicitly rejecting preferential arrangements. Adoption of MFN implied the 
absence of discrimination among countries in tariff rates although, as Taussig 
noted, it is always possible to specify a tariff as specific as the one that was 
levied on milk originating from cows grazing at a height in excess of 15,000 
feet for more than two months of the year. One can thus at least in principle 
often achieve geographic discrimination through a sufficiently pointed struc- 
ture of tariffs. 
With the notable exception of the European experience,* the first forty years 
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1. Taussig (193  1).  Taussig reported the plethora of bilateral trading agreements-with  individu- 
ally specified tariff treatment-in  the late 1800s and noted that their complexity gradually drove 
countries to consider more uniformity across countries. He dates the American move toward inclu- 
sion of MFNs in commercial treaties as starting in 1924. 
2. The European Union (EU) began life as the European Common Market, with six founding 
members: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. It expanded to 
twelve members as Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom acceded 
in the 1970s and 1980s. During that period, it was also renamed the European Community. In the 
1990s the name once again changed, to European Union, to connote the move toward a ‘‘single 
market.” Additional countries (including Austria, Sweden, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hun- 
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of the postwar era were marked by trade liberalization in a multilateral context. 
Such preferential arrangements as there were (East African Common Market, 
Latin American Free Trade Association, and so on) were either disbanded or 
largely ineffectual, again with the notable exception  of  the European Union 
(EU). Even Commonwealth preferences were abandoned as Britain joined the 
European Common Market. 
The EU itself seemed “different.” First and most important, integration of 
the European economies took place, at least through the 1970s, in the context 
of  liberalization of trade with the rest of the world. Second, motives for Euro- 
pean integration seemed more political  than economic (“strategic” in Whal- 
ley’s words); several EU “crises” would most likely have resulted in the disso- 
lution of the arrangement had it not been  for overriding  political  concerns. 
Third, the direction of the EU was clearly toward much greater integration than 
a preferential trading arrangement (PTA) alone would have implied. 
The initial proposals for a European Common Market spurred considerable 
thought regarding PTAs in the 1940s and 1950s. Out of that literature, which 
included most prominently Meade (19.53)  and Viner (19.50),’ came the classic 
distinction between trade creation and trade diversion, which has been in one 
way or another central to the analysis of the effects of PTAs ever since. 
For, while the initial instinct of economists and others was to assume that 
formation of  a PTA  meant the lowering of trade barriers and must therefore 
be a movement toward freer trade and hence welfare-enhancing, the Vinerian 
distinction between  trade creation  and  trade diversion  vividly  demonstrated 
that analysis of PTAs was in the domain of second best. That is, comparison is 
not between a first-best policy (free trade, in the absence of monopoly power 
in trade4) and a policy in which first-best conditions are violated, but between 
two policies in each of  which first-best conditions are violated but in differ- 
ent ways. 
Whereas first-best policy is for the domestic marginal rates of transforma- 
tion (DMRTs) among commodities to equal the international marginal rates of 
transformation (IMRTs), a country entering a PTA is typically moving from a 
situation in which DMRTs are unequal to the IMRTs (because of the presence 
of  tariffs pre-PTA) to a situation in which the DMRTs become equal to the 
___~ 
gary) are now seeking membership. In partial reaction to the Common Market, a European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA) was formed among a number of countries (including the United King- 
dom  and  others who  subsequently  joined  the  EU).  EFTA  countries  entered  into  free trade 
agreements with each other, and had free trade in manufactured goods with the countries in the 
EU. I shall use the term European Union (EU) when reference is to current practices or practices 
that still continue. When reference is to a specific time in the past, I shall use the name applicahlc 
at the time. 
3. See Lipsey (1960) for a survey of the literature to that date. 
4.  Unless there is a divergence between domestic and international marginal rates of transforma- 
tion, free trade is always a first-best policy for a country: domestic distortions in a first-hest world 
are corrected through the appropriate domestic interventions. From a global perspective, of course, 
free trade is optimal even when individual countries have monopoly power in trade. 261  Overview 
marginal rates of transformation in some trading partners, but where the mar- 
ginal rates of transformation in those trading partners are then unequal to those 
in other countries. The distortion is moved from the domestic border vis-i-vis 
all other countries to the domestic border and PTA partner countries vis-a-vis 
all other countries, and there is no a priori means for specifying which distor- 
tion is closer or farther from a Pareto-optimal outcome. As a result, trade may 
be diverted  from low-cost sources (outside the PTA) to higher-cost sources 
(within the PTA), or it may be created, as sources shift from high-cost domestic 
production to lower-cost PTA-partner prod~ction.~ 
After the initial spurt of interest in PTAs in the 1950s, the apparent ascen- 
dancy of the multilateral system over PTAs led to a loss of interest in the latter, 
and economists’ research focused  almost entirely on issues associated with 
individual countries’  trade policies vis-i-vis the world economy or with the 
properties of the open multilateral system itself. Analysis of PTAs was a virtu- 
ally forgotten domain. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, however, PTAs have once again been ascending in 
importance (see WTO 1995). In 1982, the United States formally renounced 
its  earlier support for the  multilateral  system to the exclusion  of  PTAs and 
stated that it would welcome PTAs with “like-minded” countries seeking to go 
beyond GATT in removing barriers to trade between them.6 It followed up with 
free trade arrangements (FTAs) negotiated with Israel, Canada (the Canada- 
U.S. Free Trade Agreement), and then with Canada and Mexico (North Ameri- 
can Free Trade Agreement  [NAFTA]). It is already the stated intent of the 
group of countries associated in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation group 
(APEC) to form a region of free trade by the year 2010 for developed countries 
and 2020 for less developed countries.’ The countries of  the Western Hemi- 
sphere likewise  declared  their  intent  of  reaching  a  hemisphere-wide  FTA. 
Some countries have indicated their intent to join more than one preferential 
grouping.*  Immediate challenges for the EU relate to the applications for entry 
of a variety of countries to the east and south of the existing borders. In the 
5. Note, however, that lower-cost partner production need not be the low-cost world  source. 
Trade creation may enhance welfare, but may nonetheless be Pareto-inferior to multilateral free 
trade. Once a PTA has been formed, those producers gaining through trade creation in either part- 
ner country may  become opponents of multilateral liberalization in order to avoid losing their 
PTA-induced markets. 
6.  The first departure from MFN for the United States for members of GATT was the acceptance 
(after much resistance) of the Generalized System of Preferences for developing countries, which 
was authorized under GATT, Even before the official announcement of  the “two-track” policy in 
the early I980s, however, the United States unilaterally extended preferences to countries eligible 
for the Caribbean Basin Initiative. 
7. The APEC wording is ambiguous as to whether the countries in the region intend to practice 
global free trade by the years specified or whether they contemplate a PTA  in the region. 
8. The United States itself would be in the Western Hemisphere Free Trade Association (the 
presumed  successor  to  NAFTA) and  the APEC grouping.  Chile  is negotiating  for entry into 
NAFTA, already has an FTA with some Latin American countries including Mexico, is in AF’EC, 
and is seeking an FTA with the EU. 262  Anne 0.  Krueger 
somewhat more distant future, the United States and EU have officially ex- 
pressed  an  interest in  the  formation  of  the Trans-Atlantic Free Trade Area 
(TAFTA). 
In these circumstances, it is natural for economists to revisit the questions 
that arise out of  PTAs, and the papers at this conference  address some key 
aspects of  those questions. Analysis is difficult for several reasons. In large 
part, this is because of the second-best aspect of PTAs. What we would ideally 
like to know is the level of economic efficiency (for the world as a whole and 
for individual  trading  nations)  and welfare  associated  with worldwide  free 
trade contrasted  with  that of  individual  nations under  their existing tariffs, 
compared in turn with welfare under preferential arrangements. But even that 
very ambitious specification is not enough: to determine welfare under existing 
tariffs, is it legitimate to compare a country’s tariff  situation with that under 
free trade, assuming that other countries retain their existing tariff structure? 
Or should it instead be recognized that if, for example, India went to free trade, 
there might follow some adjustment of tariffs in other countries? And, as if 
these questions were not difficult enough, questions arise as to the determi- 
nants of tariff levels under preferential arrangements contrasted with the deter- 
minants of tariffs of individual countries9 
Moreover, given that global free trade represents a Pareto optimum from the 
viewpoint of the world as a whole,Io determinants of tariff structures remain a 
puzzle to economists.  Moreover, a central question is whether formation of 
PTAs is conducive to leading the world closer to multilateral  free trade  or, 
instead, is likely to lead to larger trade barriers between PTA  groupings  as 
trade barriers within PTAs are dismantled. Indeed, in an important sense, the 
extent to which formation  of  PTAs is conducive to further liberalization of 
world trade in the future is the key question for analysts. 
Even if we did have an accepted theory of the political economy of  tariff 
determination, we would still need a theory and methodology for estimating 
what bilateral trade flows would be under each of the hypothesized circum- 
stances. Whereas theory offers a good guide at least to the economic cost of a 
tariff or the tariff equivalent of other trade bamers, there is little in theory to 
help in ascertaining what “optimal” bilateral trade flows are. 
9. An interesting set of questions is which countries might gain by  aligning themselves with 
which trading partners in any preferential arrangement. 
10. One of the difficult questions that has not been satisfactorily addressed in the literature on 
the political economy of trade policy is why compensation mechanisms cannot be created between 
countries (and, for that matter, within countries that lack monopoly power in trade) so that free 
trade is a reality. After all, even if there is monopoly power in trade, the rest of the world could 
afford to bribe the monopolist to practice free trade, leaving both the monopolist and the rest of 
the world better off. In light of Becker’s argument (I 983) that wealth transfers will be effected in 
the cheapest possible way, this puzzle compels attention. None of the papers at this conference (or 
elsewhere, to my knowledge) seriously addresses this issue, so it is ignored here. 263  Overview 
9.2  Motives for Forming Preferential Trading Arrangements 
The papers at this conference all represent significant steps forward in ad- 
dressing these questions. John Whalley addresses two of the key questions: the 
welfare costs that might be associated with a world of FTAs with large trade 
barriers between  groupings, and the motives for small countries in entering 
PTAs. He notes that there are a variety of motives for forming PTAs, and then 
develops a model in which small countries need to defend themselves against 
potential losses should large countries with monopoly power in trade exercise 
that power by forming trading blocs and imposing optimal tariffs. To examine 
this question, Whalley formulates a computable general equilibrium model, 
following Krugman (1991) in assuming that individual nations in the absence 
of  FTAs and trading blocs levy optimal tariffs on each other. Assuming that 
countries levy optimal tariffs provides an analytical framework within which 
tariff levels can be endogenously determined and, as such, has a great deal to 
be said for it, Whalley’s estimates of the magnitudes  of  potential gains (re- 
sulting from terms of trade changes) are interesting and useful. 
A first part of the exercise examines the welfare impact of individual coun- 
tries’ and groups of countries’ impositions of optimal tariffs. One of the fears 
about PTAs has been that they might ultimately result in the division of  the 
world into trading blocs: as trade relations become more and more open among 
PTA  members, it is possible that barriers to trade with the outside increase. 
Whalley’s model provides a basis for estimating how large the gains and losses 
under such a scenario might be. 
In Whalley’s model,  since large countries have most monopoly  power in 
trade, they lose if  they are bound under a PTA not to use that power against 
their FTA partners. Small countries, however, seek insurance against the even- 
tuality of  the exercise of monopoly power by large countries, which is their 
motive for entering a PTA with a large country. This, in turn, implies that large 
countries should receive a static benefit from PTA  membership to offset the 
costs of forgone future monopoly power against them. 
Because of the complexity of Whalley’s model, there are some key simpli- 
fying assumptions and estimates to which the results are highly sensitive.” The 
numbers need, therefore, to be taken as a first approximation. In a country- 
specific model of optimum-tariff-ridden Nash equilibrium, for example, Whal- 
ley’s estimates suggest that the United States and Europe would come out as 
net gainers (1.2 percent and 3.7 percent of national income, respectively) while 
Japan would emerge a loser (5.2 percent of income).’*  But the really big losers 
11. Chief among these appear to be the two-good assumption with each region producing only 
one good for export and importing the other good, and the use of Armington elasticities. These 
latter clearly drive the estimates in an optimal-tariff and retaliation framework. 
12. That the elasticities may be suspect is illustrated by  examination of Whalley’s individual 
numbers. For example, in a postretaliation equilibrium, U.S. tariffs against the EU product is over 264  Anne 0.  Krueger 
are the smaller countries, as illustrated by the estimated losses of 25.5 percent 
and 8.5 percent for Canada and Mexico, respectively, if they were to go into a 
tariff  war alone. The rest of the world  is estimated  to suffer a welfare  loss 
equivalent to 10.6 percent of national income. 
The rest of the world, consisting of unaligned countries sufficiently small so 
that they cannot individually affect their terms of trade, has the most to lose if 
the world divides into trading blocs. As such, small countries  may feel im- 
pelled to align themselves with large countries (as Canada and Chile) in order 
to avoid being left out. This is an important insight,  and one that probably 
follows even if PTAs do not precisely formulate optimal tariffs.I3 
One must, however, question the assumption that optimal tariffs would be 
formulated  when countries setting their individual tariffs have set tariff rates 
far below the estimated optimum in the Whalley model. To be sure, this raises 
the issue of the role of GATTNTO  (World Trade Organization) in determining 
or constraining tariff levels, which in turn is a function of the extent to which 
PTAs are a step toward multilateral liberalization or instead represent a move 
toward trading blocs with relatively high walls of protection between them. 
In discussions  of  the EU, NAFTA,  and other regional  arrangements,  one 
question has been whether there is anything special about regional PTAs, as 
contrasted with PTAs among geographically dispersed countries. Spilimbergo 
and Stein address the welfare effects of  PTAs when factor endowments, vari- 
ety, and transport costs all influence trade flows. They consider countries pro- 
ducing agricultural goods (subject to constant returns to scale) and manufac- 
tures (in which variety  is important), and examine possible PTAs in light of 
relative factor endowments (rich countries are assumed to have relatively more 
resources in manufactures because they are relatively well endowed with capi- 
tal) and transport costs. 
Not surprisingly, they find that, the more weight attached to product variety, 
the greater the gains from forming a PTA among rich countries (that produce 
varietal goods). This leaves open, of course, the question of why rich countries 
would impose tariffs on the importation of varietal goods from other rich coun- 
tries and not resort unilaterally to zero tariffs for these items. In their model, 
when trade is predominantly comparative-advantage-based, the welfare bene- 
fits to rich countries from forming a PTA  with a poor country increase and 
400 percent and the EU tariff against the American product is over 900 percent. This results in a 
shrinkage of trade volumes to 5 percent or less of initial trade flows. It is difficult to believe that 
the gains from improved terms of trade could offset losses in the quantity of trade of this magnitude 
without extraordinarily small (in absolute value) elasticities of demand. It may be noted that Whal- 
ley’s estimated optimal tariff postretaliation for the United States is over 400 percent for all re- 
gions, while that of the EU is over 800 percent. 
13. The model also has interesting insights to the sequence in which bargaining with respect to 
entry into a PTA takes place. Clearly, in Whalley’s model small countries are better off bargaining 
jointly  for a PTA  than  they  are bargaining sequentially, as they  must give up less to the large 
country to obtain insurance. However, the last to enter a sequential bargain may be better off than 
the first, as Whalley finds that Canada would have been better off to bargain after Mexico (because 
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those associated with a PTA among rich countries diminish. Spilimbergo and 
Stein also find that poor countries will always be better off integrating with a 
rich country, and will always be worse off when entirely left out of any trading 
bloc. Finally, in the absence of transport costs, their model yields the result that 
consolidation of the world into a few PTAs would result in reduced welfare. 
They then turn to the role of  distance in the formation  of  PTAs. Earlier, 
Krugman (1991) and Summers (1991) had pointed  to “natural trading part- 
ners” as being geographically proximate. They then argued that the formation 
of PTAs was likely to be beneficial. Spilimbergo and Stein attempt to test this 
in the context of their model by adding distance and transport costs explicitly. 
Adding transport costs is similar to increasing the importance of comparative- 
advantage-based trade (because of the lower elasticity of  substitution among 
such goods than among varieties of the same product). 
They use this framework to simulate several possible PTA scenarios. In an 
interesting one, they examine whether Chile would be better off in NAFTA or 
in Mercosur: the latter would dominate only if transport costs were very high 
(which would greatly reduce the potential trade between Chile and northern 
members of NAFTA). In general, as transport costs increase, the welfare gains 
from regional PTAs increase, and, in the limit as transport costs become pro- 
hibitive, regional PTAs capture all the potential gains from trade with no fur- 
ther gains accruing from a multilateral trading system. 
Spilimbergo and Stein’s results provoke a number of questions. If, as their 
model indicates and as seems reasonable, the gains to multilateral trade in- 
crease as transport costs fall, why should regional PTAs emerge in the 1990s 
when transport costs are far lower than they were several decades ago? Why, 
too, should resistance in developed countries to PTAs between developed and 
developing countries appear to be so much greater than to PTAs between devel- 
oped countries if, as their model suggests, welfare gains to developed countries 
are greater in the latter case? Does this suggest the predominance of compara- 
tive-advantage-based  trade? 
The conclusions of the Whalley and the Spilimbergo-Stein models point to 
the centrality of the determinants of the structure of protection pre- and post- 
FTA. Those issues, in turn, divide into the political economy of tariff determi- 
nation and into the determinants of the form (FTA or customs union) of PTA. 
These issues are dealt with in part of the paper by Frankel and Wei.I4 Turning 
first to tariff determination, they consider the optimal tariff case, covered by 
Whalley,  and political-economy  models  where  other  considerations  are in- 
volved. Trade diversion resulting from a customs union or free trade area, for 
example, is likely to lead to more opposition to multilateral trade liberaliza- 
tion because those benefiting from the PTA would lose their gains to third coun- 
tries  in  a multilateral framework. This is the outcome, for example, of  the 
14. Whalley also has some results pertaining to differences between FTAs and customs unions 
in the context of his model. 266  Anne 0.  Krueger 
Grossman-Helpman (1995) median voter model, and also Levy’s model (forth- 
coming) in which support for trade liberalization arises from increased varietal 
trade while opposition emerges when trade is factor-endowment-based. Once 
a PTA has been formed, support for further trade liberalization is diminished, 
as part of the variety-based gains from trade are already achieved. 
A critical question in the “stumbling bloc or building bloc?’  analysis fo- 
cuses on the terms on which new members  may accede to the PTA. If  any 
country seeking membership  may join,15 an attractive PTA  could eventually 
include all countries as members and thus automatically transform into multi- 
lateral liberalization. However, issues arise if blocs form for motives such as 
those suggested by Whalley. For, as new members seek to join, the gains to the 
original members diminish. At some point, it is likely (and inevitable in some 
models) that further membership will diminish welfare and PTAs would then, 
if maximizing their individual welfare, refuse further members. 
However, there are also mechanisms by which PTAs may increase support 
for multilateral trade liberalization. These include the locking-in of trade open- 
ing (as exemplified by  Mexico), the ability of governments to insulate them- 
selves more from protectionist pressures under a PTA than unilaterally, and the 
efficiency  of  negotiating  with  larger units  such as the EU rather  than  with 
100+ individual countries. 
Frankel and Wei also sketch their own model, in which a single move to 
multilateral free trade would be opposed by workers in two of three industries 
(each of which employs an equal number of workers), but in which a move to 
an FTA would arouse opposition only from those in one of the two industries 
(as the FTA partner is not a threat in one industry and the price of the second 
imported product might be lower). Once the PTA is in place, however, workers 
in the industry that already faced import competition from the PTA  partner 
will, along with those in the export industry, support a further move to multilat- 
eral free trade. 
While this sequence would lead to further trade liberalization,I6 that is not 
inevitable, as Frankel and Wei recognize. If sufficient trade diversion occurs 
under a PTA, it could result in a majority’s blocking further multilateral lib- 
eralization, even in circumstances where an initial majority might have sup- 
ported it. 
In this regard, nothing in economic theory suggests that preferences should 
be either 100 percent or zero. Indeed, the economic logic of trade creation and 
trade diversion  suggests that partial  preferences might be optimal, although 
GATTNTO rules permit PTAs only when preferences are 100 percent. It has 
been suggested, however, that keeping preferential arrangements within low 
15. As  noted by Frankel and Wei, a number of models have been developed in which nonmem- 
ber countries do find it in their interest to join a PTA. 
16. Other arguments that an PTA would lead to further liberalization have not been modeled. It 
has been argued, for example, that firms that are not currently trading internationally may gain 
experience in a regional PTA that will then reduce their fears of further trade opening. 267  Overview 
limits (22 percent reduction below multilateral tariffs is the number reported 
in Frankel-Wei from Stein) would maintain incentives for PTAs to accept new 
members, or to move to multilateral free trade. 
There are also contrasts between customs unions and FTAs, and the choice 
may be based on political-economy considerations. FTAs may be more amena- 
ble to capture by  special-interest groups, through exploitation of rules of ori- 
gin. Accession of new members to an FTA will be more difficult and less auto- 
matic than under a customs union, because differences in external tariffs will 
drive negotiations over rules of  origin applicable to the new member in an 
FTA, and not in a customs union where the external tariff is given. Frankel and 
Wei also note that sectoral exclusions are far easier in FTAs than in customs 
unions (and are, at least in principle, illegal under WTO and GATT). However, 
FTAs may be more conducive to further multilateral trade liberalization, as 
there  will  be pressure  on producers  importing  inputs into the  higher-tariff 
countries to seek tariff reductions. 
9.3  Empirical Evidence 
The papers discussed so far have examined the welfare effects of PTAs, and 
have shed light on certain aspects of the issue, but also raise a number of ques- 
tions, many of whose answers depend on the relative orders of magnitude of 
different effects. In light of these results, it is natural that considerable research 
efforts should go into empirical work, estimating quantitatively the effects of 
PTAs on trade flows. 
Researchers attempting to understand bilateral trade flows early on turned 
to econometric estimates of the determinants of trade, starting with a gravity 
model in which bilateral flows are a function of their size (as reflected by GDP 
and population) and the costs of transacting business between them (usually 
taken to be a function of distance). When interest turned to the effects of PTAs, 
dummy variables for the presence of WAS  were introduced into gravity models 
to test for the quantitative effects of preferential arrangements. 
Before interest focused on the effects of PTAs, the gravity model was al- 
ready found to do a good job of explaining bilateral trade flows, and econo- 
mists began developing theories consistent with these mode1s.I’  Deardorff‘s 
paper represents a contribution to the theoretical foundation for these models, 
showing that they are consistent with virtually any model of  trade in which 
different countries specialize in different groups of commodities.18  Deardorff 
starts by  positing  an international price vector, in response  to which in the 
absence of transport costs countries’ production takes place. Demands (at the 
17. See Deardorff‘s paper for a brief overview of the evolution of  the literature. 
18. If two countries specialized in precisely the same commodities, of  course, they would not 
export to each other. In Deardorff‘s  model, however, there are no transport costs, and domestic 
production is treated as being thrown on the world market and then randomly assigned to im- 
porting countries, including the producer. 268  Anne 0.  Krueger 
same international price vector) from each country are then randomly matched 
by supplies and, since transport costs don’t matter, a home country’s buyers of 
the  good  it exports  may  nonetheless  satisfy  their  demands  from a foreign 
source while the country’s exports are greater than domestic production less 
domestic demand. 
Deardorff then proceeds to introduce transport costs, which insure that fac- 
tor price equalization will not obtain, and, in a world with many more com- 
modities than countries, he argues that it is likely that most goods will be sup- 
plied by only one country. In that circumstance, a gravity equation for bilateral 
trade flows would be justified even in a Heckscher-Ohlin world. Thus, the grav- 
ity model would  appear to  be consistent  with  virtually  any trade model  in 
which specialization obtains. 
Frankel and Wei  use a gravity-model specification in their paper and aug- 
ment it with a number of variables that can plausibly  be thought to influence 
bilateral  trade flows. These include distance between  each pair of  countries 
(which may influence not only transport  costs but interest charges and other 
user  costs), contiguous borders, and a common  language between  a pair of 
countries. They then add dummy variables for regional groupings. They csti- 
mate the model using data for sixty-three countries (which gives 1,953 bilateral 
trade observations), for four years between  I970 and 1992. 
Frankel and Wei’s data show that the “affinity” variables are significant and 
that there are intraregional trade biases. Western European countries are esti- 
mated  to have traded  17 percent  more than the  unaugmented  model would 
have predicted, and the trade of Western Hemisphere countries, APEC, and the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was about 40, 2 15, and 145 
percent higher than predicted. 
But they then proceed to examine the extent to which  intraregional trade 
was higher because the pair of  countries in question traded more overall, and 
were thus more open than average, as contrasted with a circumstance in which 
greater trade between a country pair might arise at the expense of third coun- 
tries  (outside the PTA). The Western European  and East Asian groups were 
found to have such high coefficients because they were trading more overall, 
relative to their size. An East Asian country, for example, traded about twice 
as much with a country outside the region than two random countries outside 
East Asia even after account was taken of distance and the other variables men- 
tioned above. Frankel and Wei interpret these results to imply that intraregional 
trade in East Asia and Western Europe has not grown at the expense of trade 
with third countries, and thus has been predominantly trade-creating. 
Interestingly, both APEC and the Western Hemisphere countries trade less 
than predicted; once that is taken into account, the larger-than-predicted trade 
within each group is taken as a sign of trade diversion. As a next step, Frankel 
and Wei  take into account the trend over time in “openness” and in greater- 
than-predicted  intraregional  trade.  In  the  Western European  case, countries 
were trading more outside the region  than predicted in  1970, and gradually 
shifted toward  more trade within  the region; by the end of  the period, their 269  Overview 
extra-European trade  was still larger than  predicted,  but less so than  it had 
been in earlier years. 
When Frankel and Wei turn to formal regional groupings, they find that the 
EC, Mercosur,  and ASEAN  all  exhibited  “openness”  in  the  sense defined 
above. By contrast, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and NAFTA 
show evidence of trade diversion. Their interpretation is that most countries 
that choose to liberalize their trade with neighbors are also more able to liberal- 
ize internationally, but that either result can happen. 
Finally, Frankel and Wei investigate the extent to which currency blocs and 
currency stability seem to follow regional trading blocs and to influence the 
volume of trade between country pairs. They find evidence of a European cur- 
rency bloc (around the mark) and a dollar bloc in the Pacific, with no evidence 
of a yen bloc. They also find some evidence supporting the view that exchange 
rate volatility has suppressed trade flows. 
Frankel, Stein, and Wei obtain yet further results  with the gravity model. 
They include many  of the  same variables  as in Frankel  and Wei  and add a 
number of  variables such as per capita income levels to reflect the “affinity” 
between countries. They then  estimate their model with data for sixty-three 
countries (1,953 bilateral trade observations) for three years, 1970, 1980, and 
1990. 
In this paper, they are concerned with the importance of “affinity” variables 
and again focus on the extent to which trade flows deviate from predicted levels 
because of these and other factors. Western European countries are estimated 
to have traded 36 percent more than  the unaugmented  gravity model would 
have predicted. 
They then examine the extent to which intraregional trade was higher be- 
cause the pair of countries in question was more open than average, as well as 
trends  in  intraregional trade  in  these  regions  over time.  Intra-EU trade  in- 
creases over time, but not at a statistically significant rate once the other vari- 
ables are taken  into account. Intra-Asian trade is high, but shows no trend. 
Frankel, Stein, and Wei interpret these results to imply that intraregional trade 
grew rapidly, and then turn to the question of whether the growth was trade- 
creating or at the expense of trade with the rest of the world. 
They augment their model with transport costs and imperfect competition, 
and show that for reasonable values of the transport parameter, regional prefer- 
ential  groupings  are  welfare-improving  contrasted  with  geographically  re- 
moved partner preferences. However, overall they conclude that the extent of 
preferences among regional partners has probably significantly exceeded the 
optimal amount. 
The improved theoretical grounding for gravity models provided by Deard- 
orff and the fact that Frankel and Wei, and Frankel, Stein, and Wei, can obtain 
such significant and interpretable relationships between  the gravity-equation 
dummy variables appears to lend credence to the use of these techniques for 
interpretation of the impact of PTAs and other variables of interest. 
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its results. They note, first, that intraregional flows are higher than predicted 
before, as well as when, a PTA is in force. Second, they point to a number of 
reasons why “history should matter.”  That it should matter has been demon- 
strated in the hysteresis literature: once an exporter has developed a distribu- 
tion network in another country, he is likely to continue using it unless there is 
a large decrease in profitability. There can be several reasons for this. It may 
be because fixed costs are sunk and only variable costs need be covered; it may 
result simply from acquaintance with the market. To be sure, exogenous events 
such as war or depression may  significantly shift historical trading patterns, 
but Eichengreen and Irwin expect the influence of historical trading ties to be 
important much of the time. 
Eichengreen and Irwin note that failure to include lagged variables in a grav- 
ity model will significantly bias estimates of  effects of  PTAs  if  PTAs  are 
formed among countries with unusually close trading ties pre-PTA. That there 
might be unusually strong motivation to form a PTA with countries with which 
there are unusually strong trade ties seems plausible. Eichengreen and Irwin 
point to the possibility that countries might form a PTA to insulate their trade 
with important trading partners from shocks. 
Eichengreen and Irwin use their data set (thirty-four countries for 1928 and 
1938; thirty-eight countries for  1949, 1954, and  1964) to examine whether 
“history matters.” They test the extent to which deviations of  trade patterns 
from the straightforward gravity predictions in one period are explained at least 
in part by deviations in preceding periods. 
In their specification, the usual gravity-model variables are significant and 
surprisingly stable for the various years for which  they  provide estimates. 
When they add lagged trade as another variable, however, the magnitude of 
coefficients on current incomes and distance is reduced. Trade in 1949 (after 
the disruption of  the Second World War) is significantly influenced by trade 
patterns in 1928 and 1938, with 1938 trade being twice as important as 1928 
trade. By  1964, however, the impact of prewar trade patterns has disappeared. 
One interesting result that arises from their specification is that, despite the 
smaller estimated “direct” income coefficients in their equations, one can esti- 
mate a “long-run’’ elasticity of  trade with respect to income, taking into ac- 
count, for example, the effect on trade in  1954 of additional income in  1949 
when it is recognized that the increased trade in 1949 increases trade in 1954. 
These estimated “long-run’’ trade elasticities are higher than those obtained in 
a gravity model without lagged variables. 
Having estimated their model and demonstrated the importance of  lagged 
variables, Eichengreen and Irwin then proceed to introduce dummy variables: 
a first dummy variable is when both countries are members of the same PTA, 
a second when only one country is. The coefficient on the first dummy, if posi- 
tive, would indicate positive trade creation between the PTA partners; the sec- 
ond, if negative, would indicate trade diversion from third countries. 
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with one another (positive first dummy) than predicted in 1949 after the con- 
clusion of the first round of  multilateral tariff reductions, but this effect had 
disappeared by  the  1950s.I9 Countries that had been British colonies traded 
more with Britain and less with the rest of the world in 1949 than predicted; 
by the 1950s, however, these countries traded less with the rest of the world 
and no more than predicted with Britain. 
Eichengreen and Irwin's  demonstration that history does indeed matter is 
convincing. Nonetheless,  it raises the question of whether history  itself, or 
some characteristics of trading partners that are correlated over time, are the 
variables yielding their results. Interestingly, none of the discussion of gravity 
models in the conference explicitly addressed the role of trade barriers in in- 
fluencing bilateral flows. Although the presence of a regional arrangement im- 
plicitly represents  the absence (or at least the greatly reduced presence)  of 
trade barriers, one would anticipate that the average height of protection  of 
PTA members toward trade with nonpartners would be a significant variable. 
Perhaps for lack of  the requisite data, such a specification has not been at- 
tempted. 
Nonetheless, a number of findings suggest that variables with serial correla- 
tion may be at work. Commonwealth preferences, after all, were extended for 
a long time and reflected lower trade barriers among Commonwealth countries 
than between those countries and other trading partners. Likewise, the high 
coefficients found on openness in East Asia and Western Europe both in Fran- 
kel and Wei and in Eichengreen and Irwin may reflect the fact that the countries 
in those groupings had relatively low external trade barriers. By contrast, most 
countries in the Western Hemisphere (with the exception of the United States) 
had relatively high trade barriers for the periods covered by the various data 
sets, and trade among Western Hemisphere countries may have been less than 
average for the world over several time periods for that reason. The same phe- 
nomenon may have been at work in the ASEAN region. Certainly, if one esti- 
mated the average tariff equivalent of trade barriers for the postwar years in- 
cluded in the two studies, it seems clear that Europe, the United States, and 
probably Japan after 1970 had lower trade barriers in general than did other 
countries of Asia, all of Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa. All else 
equal, countries with higher trade barriers would be expected to trade less than 
countries with lower ones. 
Other empirical aspects of PTAs are examined in chapters 7 and 8. Kowal- 
czyk and Davis analyze intrabloc tariff reform, while Engel and Rogers exam- 
ine the law of one price, and the difference borders (and regional groupings) 
make to its functioning. 
Kowalczyk and Davis examine the time- and industry-specific patterns of 
phase-outs in regional PTAS in order to attempt to assess whether the pattern 
19. To be sure, the fact that trade among GA'M members had increased in 1949 influences the 
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of phase-outs was welfare improving (if higher tariffs were reduced sooner) or 
not (if tariff dispersion increased during the phase-out period). In  doing  SO, 
they are not examining trade creation versus trade diversion in the traditional 
sense, and are examining only the period of  transition  en route to full PTA 
status. They find that higher-duty imports into the United States tended to have 
longer tariff phase-out periods under NAFTA than did lower-duty items, but 
there was no similar pattern  for Mexico. As discussed with respect to other 
papers, the absence of a satisfactory explanation of existing tariff levels forms 
a major difficulty in interpreting their results. The simplest explanation for the 
finding might be that industries in the United States with high tariffs are the 
ones that have the most political influence over bargaining processes, and that 
they were able to use that influence  in NAFTA negotiations  (to slow down 
phase-out) as they had earlier used it to obtain high tariffs. 
But, as in all such analyses, the more fundamental question arises: how were 
U.S. and Mexican authorities able to set the agenda for NAFTA in such a way 
that only the timing of tariff phase-out could be affected? To be sure, rules of 
origin and other side measures were also used, but the fundamental proposition 
remains: the political power of various groups was seriously eroded once the 
commitment to NAFTA was made: all that could be done was to slow it down 
(through slow phase-outs) and to seek other protectionist devices (rules of ori- 
gin) as partial replacements. 
These considerations raise  one important  set of  issues for research  with 
which this conference did not deal: that is, the role of institutional arrange- 
ments in constraining the choices of various actors in seeking or granting pro- 
tection. The papers assuming the use of optimal tariffs for PTAs did so on the 
implicit assumption that GATTNTO rules would not apply (because tariffs 
are bound under WTO). Yet those rules have clearly been an important factor 
in the liberalization of the world economy over the past half century. Likewise, 
the existence of  multilateral tariff  negotiations under GATT enabled export 
interests in various countries to restrain  politicians in granting protection to 
import-competing interests. In considering whether PTAs are likely to be con- 
ducive or a hindrance to further liberalization of the multilateral trading sys- 
tem, issues such as their role in tariff negotiating processes need to be con- 
si  dered . 
Even more broadly, there are important questions as to the sorts of institu- 
tional design or constraints on PTAs (customs union only?) that would increase 
the likelihood of further liberalization multilaterally. While a cynic might re- 
spond that the level of protection is determined by national governments  in 
their own self-interest, he would have to answer difficult questions as to why 
such governments  enter into PTAS,  and whether  institutional  arrangements 
might not be found that altered self-interest. But those issues constitute a re- 
search agenda for one or more conferences in the future. 
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between regions and across national borders. In an important sense, their meth- 
odology represents an alternative to gravity models as a mechanism for exam- 
ining the effects of PTAs. In particular, they use observations of prices of com- 
modities in different locations at the same point in time, and then attempt to 
estimate  the  determinants  of  price  differences.  They find that  nominal  ex- 
change rate variability  and distance both  account for a significant portion of 
the failure of the law of one price to hold. 
Further, they find that prices of the same commodity diverge more between 
regions (holding other variables constant) than they do within a regional (North 
America, EU) preferential grouping, but that divergence is not reduced within 
Asia. This tends to reinforce findings of others that Asia is less integrated as a 
region than is Western Europe. 
Examination of price patterns is a valuable methodology for increasing our 
understanding of the role of borders and other factors in preventing the law of 
one price from obtaining. But, as Kenneth Froot noted in discussion, ascertain- 
ing what an identical commodity is is difficult. For example, goods sold in 
upscale shops differ from those sold in discount stores. Efforts to make price 
comparisons must confront the challenge that problems such as this present. 
9.4  Conclusions: What Have We  Learned and What Do We Need 
to Know? 
The papers presented at this conference all add to knowledge and under- 
standing concerning trade patterns in a world in which PTAs are formed. If 
one turns to the “big questions” posed at the beginning, one would have to 
conclude that, to date, the evidence is that PTAs have on balance more likely 
been trade-creating than trade-diverting. In part, this is probably a natural con- 
sequence of falling transport and communications costs and of the successive 
rounds of  multilateral tariff reductions under GATT. After all, the lower the 
average level of protection, the less meaningful are tariff preferences. 
The fact of multilateral trade liberalization meant that increased integration 
within PTAs (notably the EU) took place concurrently with increased openness 
of most economies. The evidence from the empirical research reported at this 
conference suggests that, for the most part, increasing regional integration was 
taking place, but at a faster rate than increasing global integration, which was 
nonetheless occurring. 
For the future, a number of questions arise. Clearly, the long-term impact 
of PTAs depends on whether they are accompanied by continued multilateral 
liberalization or instead they substitute for it. Assessing the impact of PTAs on 
future multilateral trade relations is exceptionally difficult. In part, it depends 
on how influential the GATT institutional role is thought to have been in the 
past. It depends as well on the sorts of political-economy considerations dis- 
cussed above, including especially the extent to which PTAs now in the process 274  Anne 0.  Krueger 
of  formation  represent  trade creation  or trade  diversion.  Perhaps  most  im- 
portant of all, it depends very much on the costs of disintegration of the world 
trading system into regional groupings along the lines discussed by Whalley. 
On all  of  these issues, a great deal remains  to be learned. Based on the 
evidence in this conference, however, there are at least weak grounds for opti- 
mism that PTAs may contribute to, rather than substitute for, continued multi- 
lateral trade liberalization. 
References 
Becker, Gary.  1983. A Theory of  Competition among Pressure Groups for Political 
Influence. Quarterly Journal of  Economics 98 (August): 37 1-400. 
Grossman, Gene, and Elhanan Helpman. 1995. The Politics of Free Trade Agreements. 
American Economic Review 85 (September): 667-90. 
Krugman, Paul. 1991. Is Bilateralism Bad? In Elhanan Helpman and Assaf Razin, eds., 
International Trade and Trade Policy. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Levy, Philip. Forthcoming. A Political-Economic Analysis of  Free Trade Agreements. 
American Economic Review. 
Lipsey, Richard. 1960. The Theory of Customs Unions: A General Survey. Economic 
Journal 70 (September): 496-5  13. 
Meade, James.  1953. Problems of  Economic  Union. Chicago: University of  Chicago 
Press. 
Summers, Lawrence. 1991. Regionalism and the World Trading System. In Federal 
Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Policy Implications of  the Trade and Currency Zones, 
295-302.  Kansas City: Federal Reserve Bank. 
Taussig, Frank. 1931. A Tariff History of  the  United States. New  York: Putnam and 
Sons. 
Viner, Jacob.  1950. The Customs Union Issue. New York:  Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace. 
World Trade Organization Secretariat. 1995. Regionalism and the World Trading Sys- 
tem. Geneva: World Trade Organization. 